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Abstract. In this paper the economic performance of post-independence Latin
America is assessed in comparative perspective. The release from the colonial fiscal
burden was partly offset by higher costs of self-government, while the opening
of independent Latin American countries to the international economy represented
a handmaiden of growth. Regional disparities increased after independence,
so generalisations about the region’s long-run behaviour are not straightforward.
However, on average, per capita income grew in Latin America, and although the
region fell behind compared with the United States and Western Europe, it im-
proved or maintained its position relative to the rest of the world. Thus the term
‘ lost decades ’ appears an unwarranted depiction of the period between 1820 and
1870.
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Independence, a long process completed only in 1825, is seen as the most
important event in nineteenth-century Latin American economic history.1
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Two different approaches to the post-independence era in Latin America
can be distinguished. One uses the United States as a yardstick and results
in pessimistic assessments of Latin America’s post-colonial performance.2
Another, associated with the recent growth and development literature that
looks into the historical roots of present backwardness in different world
regions, depicts – in its most recent form – the half century that followed
independence as ‘ lost decades ’.3 The purpose of this paper is to challenge
these views by assessing the performance of Latin America during the period
between the achievement of colonial emancipation (around 1820) and the
beginning of the first wave of globalisation (around 1870). While not re-
jecting the comparison with the United States, the argument here suggests
that contrasting Latin America’s economic performance with those world
regions that shared its main features, namely, former European colonies with
similar geographical conditions and factor endowments and comparable
levels of per capita income at independence, can provide new insights into
the causes of Latin America’s current retardation.4
A caveat is needed regarding the inclusion of Brazil and Cuba. Although the
paper focuses on economic performance after independence, Brazil (a country
that remained united and reached full independence gradually), and Cuba
(which remained under colonial rule until 1898 and was largely stable for
History of Latin America and the United States ’, in Walther L. Bernecker and Hans W.
Tobler (eds.), Development and Underdevelopment in America : Contrasts in Economic Growth in
North America and Latin America in Historical Perspective (New York, 1993), pp. 10–30.
2 Douglass C. North, ‘ Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction ’,
World Development, vol. 17, no. 9 (1989), pp. 1319–32; Douglass C. North, William R.
Summerhill and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Order, Disorder, and Economic Change : Latin
America versus North America ’, in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root (eds.),
Governing for Prosperity (New Haven, 2000), pp. 17–58 ; Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L.
Sokoloff, ‘Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth among New
World Economies ’, in Stephen Haber (ed.), How Latin America Fell Behind : Essays on the
Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800–1914 (Stanford, 1997), pp. 260–304.
3 See, for example, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘Reversal of
Fortune : Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income
Distribution ’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1231–94; Graziella
Bertocchi and Fabio Canova, ‘Did Colonization Matter for Growth? An Empirical
Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment ’, European Economic
Review, vol. 46, no. 10 (2002), pp. 1851–71; Robert H. Bates, John H. Coatsworth and
Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Lost Decades : Post-Independence in Latin America and Africa ’,
Journal of Economic History, vol. 67, no. 4 (2007), pp. 917–43.
4 Assessments of the consequences of independence can be found in John H. Coatsworth,
‘La independencia latinoamericana : hipo´tesis sobre los costes y beneficios ’, in Leandro
Prados de la Escosura and Samuel Amaral (eds.), La independencia americana : consecuencias
econo´micas (Madrid, 1993), pp. 17–27, and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, ‘The Economic
Consequences of Independence ’, in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John H. Coatsworth and
Robert Corte´s Conde (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Latin America (Cambridge, 2006),
vol. I, pp. 463–504.
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most of the period under consideration except at its very end when the
island suffered the Ten Years’ War between 1868 and 1878), are also con-
sidered here because they provide a counterpoint of stability and gradual
institutional transition while opening up to international commodity and
factor markets.
This paper begins by considering the effects of independence across Latin
America, in particular the fiscal and commercial consequences of the end of
colonial rule and the opening of the region to the international economy, and
then analyses the aggregate economic performance of the new republics in
comparative perspective. The main findings can be summarised as follows.
First, the release of the fiscal burden of the imperial system was partly offset
in the new countries by the higher costs of governing themselves. Second,
integration into the world economy brought net gains to Latin American
economies over the long run, although they were unevenly distributed.
Third, in post-independence Latin America, per capita GDP experienced
moderate growth on average but exhibited a large variance across regions.
When compared to the United States, Latin America’s position deteriorated,
but it remained unaltered with respect to the European periphery and clearly
improved with respect to Africa and Asia. Hence, ‘ lost decades ’ seems an
unwarranted depiction of this period.
Assessing the Demise of Colonial Rule
Independence brought with it the release of the colonial fiscal and trade
burden. The colonial fiscal burden consisted of the taxes levied on the in-
digenous population, and the surpluses of the colonial administration (the
‘ remittances from the Indies ’) were sent to Spain. Strictly speaking, the fiscal
burden should be defined as uncompensated remittances, and should thus
represent net revenues for the metropolis. Since part of the remittances
was in fact allocated to the defence or security of the empire, they provide
an upper bound of the actual fiscal burden. In the 1790s this expenditure
represented more than half of all the sums sent to Spain from the
American colonies.5 By 1800, residents in Bourbon Mexico paid more
taxes than Spaniards in the metropolis and were making, therefore, a sig-
nificant contribution to the imperial administration.6 Removing colonial rule
5 Computed from data in Carlos Marichal, ‘Beneficios y costes fiscales del colonialismo: las
remesas americanas a Espan˜a, 1760–1814 ’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica, vol. 15, no. 3
(1997), pp. 475–505, and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, ‘La pe´rdida del imperio y sus
consecuencias econo´micas ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.), Independencia
americana, pp. 256–9 and 269–70.
6 Herbert Klein, ‘La economı´a de la Nueva Espan˜a, 1680–1809 : un ana´lisis a partir de las
cajas reales ’, Historia Mexicana, vol. 34, no. 136 (1985), pp. 561–609; Carlos Marichal,
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eliminated the fiscal burden and, ceteris paribus, added to Latin American
GDP.7
However, if the net gain for Latin America is to be estimated, an increase
in the costs of administering many political units, rather than a single one,
has to be taken on board. The monetary and fiscal disintegration brought
about by independence produced the demise of the largest monetary union
and fiscal structure in existence, contributed to political fragmentation, and
was reflected in weak national administrations and increasing transaction
costs.8 Separation from Spain had negative effects in terms of economic
efficiency : commercial links among regions, however weak in colonial times,
were no longer guaranteed. Increasing market integration within the Spanish
empire during the late seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century, as
shown by the convergence of prices in the Viceroyalty of Peru, came to a
halt with independence.9 Intra-colonial fiscal transfers were, according to
Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, the successful basis of the colonial sys-
tem.10 In their view, colonial self-sufficiency rather than transfers to the
metropolis was the main fiscal goal of the empire as a result of negotiation
between creole elites and the imperial authorities. However, as William
Summerhill points out, fiscal transfers would only increase aggregate output
if they went from low to high productivity areas.11 After independence un-
equal access to fiscal resources in the absence of intra-colonial redistribution
of tax revenues provoked a struggle for the control of fiscal resources
La bancarrota del virreinato : Nueva Espan˜a y las finanzas del Imperio espan˜ol, 1780–1810 (Me´xico,
1999), p. 92 ; Carlos Marichal and Marcello Carmagnani, ‘From Colonial Fiscal Regime to
Liberal Financial Order, 1750–1912 ’, in Michael D. Bordo and Robert Corte´s-Conde
(eds.), Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World Monetary and Fiscal Institutions
in the 17th through the 19th Centuries (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 284–326.
7 John H. Coatsworth, ‘Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth-Century Mexico ’,
American Historical Review, vol. 83, no. 1 (1978), pp. 80–100, guessed that the fiscal burden
represented about 4 per cent of Mexican GDP by 1800. This figure is significantly higher
than that for the ‘Thirteen Colonies ’ in North America on the eve of independence.
8 Carlos Marichal, ‘Money, Taxes, and Finance ’, in Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth and Corte´s
Conde (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 423–60.
9 Andre´s Gallo and Carlos Newland, ‘Globalizacio´n y convergencia de precios en el Imperio
espan˜ol 1660–1810 ’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica, vol. 22, no. 3 (2004), pp. 573–96, show
that the removal of trade restrictions, absence of war, and navigation improvements con-
tributed to moderate price convergence between Chile and Peru, and to lesser extent
between Peru and Spain, over the period from 1660 to 1810.
10 Regina Grafe and Marı´a Alejandra Irigoin, ‘The Spanish Empire and its Legacy : Fiscal Re-
distribution and Political Conflict in Colonial and Post-Colonial Spanish America ’, Journal
of Global History, vol. 1, no. 2 (2006), pp. 241–67.
11 William R. Summerhill, ‘Fiscal Bargains, Political Institutions, and Economic
Performance ’, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (2008), pp. 219–33, points
out that this was unlikely to have been the case, and hence the aggregate economic impact
was probably negative rather than positive.
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and led to political strife.12 Costs in defence and law enforcement had
to be duplicated, and coordination in the provision of public goods be-
came more difficult. There is, however, the theoretical possibility that the
efficient size of government was not that of one government for all of
Spanish America, but one of smaller scale. If this were the case, the benefits
from independence for Latin America would be higher than those suggested
here.
Each new republic faced the challenge of creating a new fiscal and mon-
etary system and a domestic financial market. Customs duties became the
backbone of the new fiscal systems, as in the United States after indepen-
dence.13 Unlike the United States, however, most Latin American govern-
ments suffered chronic deficits during the first half of the nineteenth century
as tax revenues stagnated and military expenses increased. In fact, fiscal
policies were subordinated to military and political caudillos, at the expense
and dilution of tax administration. A vicious cycle emerged in which fiscal
weakness led to weak government which led in turn to frequent challenges to
the elite in power. As a result, civil strife proliferated.14 According to
Douglass North, William Summerhill and Barry Weingast, the break with the
metropolis destroyed many of the institutions that provided credible com-
mitments to rights and property within the Spanish empire.15 The lack of
stabilising institutions made it impossible to achieve efficient economic or-
ganisation. Hence, a scramble to preserve colonial protection and privileges
or to secure new powers occurred.
Alas, hard empirical evidence on the impact of the release of the colonial
fiscal and trade burden on each new republic remains scant and only a few
national testimonies can be provided. In Mexico the extraordinary rise in
internal military expenditures, a growing tendency to rely on forced loans,
and the increasing fiscal autonomy of local treasuries resulted in the
12 See Alejandra Irigoin and Regina Grafe, ‘Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to
Nation-State and Empire Building ’,Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (2008),
pp. 169–209.
13 According to Miguel Angel Centeno, ‘Blood and Debt : War and Taxation in Nineteenth-
Century Latin America ’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 102, no. 6 (1997), pp. 1565–605,
between 1820 and 1870 customs revenues represented, on average, a high percentage of
current government revenues : 86 per cent in Argentina, 69 per cent in Brazil and Peru, 64
per cent in Venezuela, 59 per cent in Ecuador, 51 per cent in Chile, 37 per cent in Mexico,
and 34 per cent in Colombia. Taxing trade became a persistent feature of Latin American
history : see John H. Coatsworth and Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Always Protectionist ? Latin
American Tariffs from Independence to the Great Depression ’, Journal of Latin American
Studies, vol. 36, no. 2 (2004), pp. 205–32.
14 Centeno, ‘Blood and Debt ’, shows that most countries in Latin America suffered major
wars in the half-century after independence. Argentina with 10 wars leads the group fol-
lowed by Brazil (6), Uruguay and Mexico (5), Chile and Peru (4) and Colombia (3).
15 North et al., ‘Order, Disorder ’, pp. 54–5.
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destruction of the colonial treasury system.16 As a result the supply of credit
was reduced and, it has been argued, local credit markets disintegrated.17
Meanwhile, the internal public debt grew by nearly 40 per cent between 1823
and 1848, an outcome of growing fiscal deficits. Such a situation represented
a break with the past, as there were no deficits under colonial rule. In fact,
there were transfers of surplus from one colony to another (situados).18
Independence in Mexico led to the abolition of two major sources of income
of the colonial administration: the Indian tribute (levied on all heads of
households in Indian towns) and mining taxes (a 10 per cent duty had been
levied on all silver produced). This reduced the potential income of the state
by almost 30 per cent.19 Instability paralleled the growth of the public debt,
leading arguably to the crowding out of private investment.20 A negative
association has been posited between political instability and economic
growth in the half-century after Mexican independence.21
In the other main centre of the Spanish empire, Peru, independence took
place under different circumstances : foreign republican armies defeated
royalist elites. The destruction of fixed capital during the war, fiscal mis-
management and default, and political turmoil had a negative impact on the
economy.22 The republican state, which suffered from a chronic fiscal deficit,
increased taxation, faced a difficult recovery. As in Mexico, the abandonment
and flooding of mines and the high price of the mercury, used to refine silver,
appears to lie behind the collapse of mining.23 Independence, in the end, did
not deliver the conditions for sustained economic growth.
In another area of large indigenous population, Central America, the
economic effects of political instability and war included the destruction of
16 Carlos Marichal, ‘Una difı´cil transicio´n fiscal : del re´gimen colonial al Me´xico in-
dependiente, 1750–1850 ’, in Carlos Marichal and Daniela Marino (eds.), De colonia a nacio´n :
impuestos y polı´tica en Me´xico, 1750–1860 (Me´xico DF, 2001), pp. 19–58.
17 Marichal and Carmagnani, ‘Colonial Fiscal Regime’, p. 296.
18 Marichal, La bancarrota del virreinato, pp. 48–52.
19 Marichal and Carmagnani, ‘Colonial Fiscal Regime’, p. 298.
20 Richard J. Salvucci and Linda K. Salvucci, ‘Las consecuencias econo´micas de la in-
dependencia mexicana ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.), La independencia amer-
icana, pp. 30–53.
21 Carlos A. Ponzio, ‘Looking at the Dark Side of Things : Political Instability and Economic
Growth in Post-Independence Mexico ’ (unpublished manuscript, 2005), available at www.
economia.uanl.mx/publicaciones/Articulos-maestros/Ponzio_Political_Instability.pdf.
22 Alfonso W. Quiroz, ‘Consecuencias econo´micas y financieras del proceso de la in-
dependencia en el Peru´, 1800–1850 ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.),
La independencia americana, pp. 124–46; Paul Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano : Commercial
Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru (Princeton, 1989).
23 Spain, a major world supplier, no longer supplied mercury to mining at prices below those
prevailing internationally : see Rafael Dobado and Gustavo Marrero, ‘Minerı´a, crecimiento
y costos de la independencia en Me´xico ’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica, vol. 19, no. 3 (2001),
pp. 573–611. This argument for Mexico can also be applied to the case of Peru.
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capital, obstacles to trade and transport, and insecurity for investors, while
the government extracted forced loans from merchants.24 The prolonged
transition to private property surely introduced uncertainty that delayed in-
vestment in land improvement and increased transaction costs.25
The case of Brazil is rather exceptional as it remained united and cen-
tralised and experienced a relatively peaceful transition to independence (but
for the Pernambuco rebellion in 1817), during which time institutional con-
tinuity was apparent. It is presented here as a useful counterpoint to most
other Spanish American countries. Brazil, like Chile, behaved differently as
the country managed to create institutions that protected groups from ag-
gression and expropriation, although it failed to achieve political competition
and cooperation among sub-national administrative entities.26 Colombia, in
turn, was successful in improving the colonial tax regime and, by 1850, had a
much fairer, efficient and neutral fiscal system. The head tax on Indians,
taxes on public employees and alcabalas (a tax on all sales of domestic pro-
ducts) were eliminated, and the state drew its revenues mainly from customs
taxes on imports.27
Regarding the former Viceroyalty of the River Plate, here political stability
and economic growth were achieved in Buenos Aires and Uruguay, while
stagnation and political instability prevailed in the interior.28 The economy of
Buenos Aires benefited from the disappearance of a fiscal system that had
created disincentives for productive activities. Stable political institutions
that allowed contract enforcement were introduced.29 The Rosas dictator-
ship restricted property and free trade, but lack of political freedoms did not
imply the total suppression of economic freedoms. In the interior provinces,
24 He´ctor Lindo-Fuentes, ‘Consecuencias econo´micas de la independencia en
Centroame´rica ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.), La independencia americana,
pp. 54–79.
25 The complexity of land institutions inherited from the colonial period should be taken into
account. These included, in particular, haciendas, ejidos and communal lands with ill
defined borders, and Indian communities that linked communal ownership and group
identity.
26 Marcelo de Paiva Abreu and Luis A. Correˆa do Lago, ‘Property Rights and Fiscal Systems
in Brazil : Colonial Heritage and the Imperial Period’, in Bordo and Corte´s-Conde (eds.),
Transferring Wealth and Power, pp. 327–77; North et al., ‘Order, Disorder ’, p. 40.
27 Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Adolfo Meisel and Miguel M. Urrutia, ‘Continuities and
Discontinuities in the Fiscal and Monetary Institutions of New Granada, 1783–1850 ’, in
Bordo and Corte´s-Conde (eds.), Transferring Wealth and Power, pp. 414–50. See also Salomo´n
Kalmanovitz Krauter and Edwin Lo´pez Rivera, El ingreso colombiano en el siglo XIX (Bogota´,
2008).
28 Cf. Jeremy Adelman, Republic of Capital : Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic
World (Stanford, 1999).
29 Samuel Amaral, ‘Del mercantilismo a la libertad : las consecuencias econo´micas de la in-
dependencia argentina ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.), La independencia amer-
icana, p. 204.
Lost Decades ? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America 285
however, the principles of economic freedom were not easily accepted. Only
with the 1853 constitution was national organisation on the basis of econ-
omic freedom widely accepted, while its enforcement took another thirty
years.
The provinces of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate failed to devise an
incentive structure to keep them voluntarily united under a single govern-
ment and to take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of defence
and justice, reducing transaction costs and encouraging economic develop-
ment, as the separation of Uruguay and Paraguay revealed. Military threats
and trade blockades had long lasting economic and political consequences in
Paraguay, leading to a crisis in public finances and economic contraction, and
to the political demise of proponents ofmore representative governments and
freer trade. They also gave rise to political absolutism and the redistribution
of property towards the state.30 Economic activity in the three decades fol-
lowing independence fell below the levels reached in the late colonial period.
To summarise this section, reallocating resources from a large closed
economy, the colonial empire, to small and often open economies such as
the new republics implied a non-negligible cost. The colonial empire pro-
vided security and justice at a cost that was not too high. With independence,
new providers of protection emerged, but with a lower capacity than the
metropolis. Transaction costs increased with independence, as political and
economic institutions went through a period of turmoil and redefinition,
while continued violence between and within countries also contributed to
less well-defined property rights. These costs were higher for the new re-
publics because of their fragmentation and the loss of economies of scale.
Moreover, a single fiscal system within a monetary and customs union, such
as the Spanish empire, probably represented significant savings compared to
the multiple national fiscal and monetary units created by colonial indepen-
dence. On the whole, it can be conjectured that the benefits that countries in
Spanish America derived from the removal of the fiscal burden were partly
offset by the increasing costs of providing their own governments.
Some caveats are needed, however. The Spanish empire’s involvement in
wars during the final part of the colonial period consumed enormous funds,
and so its disappearance, as a result of independence, implied a benefit.
Moreover, the loss of economies of scale as independence brought about
political fragmentation should be balanced against the increasing costs of
keeping colonial populations under control. These objections work in favour
of the idea that independence did bring some benefits to Latin America and
30 Mario H. Pastore, ‘Crisis de la Hacienda Pu´blica, regresio´n institucional y contraccio´n
econo´mica : consecuencias de la independencia en Paraguay, 1810–1840’, in Prados de la
Escosura and Amaral (eds.), La independencia americana, pp. 164–200.
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provide a lower bound to the gains from the release of the colonial burden
that have been discussed in this section. Conversely, since part of the re-
mittances to the metropolis was allocated to the defence of the empire, the
identification of the fiscal burden with total remittances to Spain results in an
upper bound.
Opening Up to the International Economy
The release of the trade burden imposed by the colonial system allowed the
new Latin American countries to have access to expanding world commodity
and factor markets.31 Independence allowed the Latin American republics to
trade directly with Europe and North America, and represented a reduction
in transportation and commercialisation costs that, ceteris paribus, would in-
crease the volume of trade. However, warfare and political instability in the
decades following independence made the adjustment to the new inter-
national trade regime difficult. Similarly, tariff protection resulting from the
new republics’ budget constraints probably diminished the positive impact
arising from the removal of Iberian commercial monopolies.32
While the Latin American economies opened up to international trade,
this does not necessarily imply their acceptance of free trade, in the sense of
a lack of tariffs, since rising customs revenues represented a relatively in-
expensive way to increase government revenue due to the low costs of
monitoring. On the other hand, claims of increasing protectionism are not
warranted when an increase in the ratio of customs revenues to imports
(or total trade) – the nominal level of tariff protection – is accompanied by
the growth of real imports per head.33 ‘Opening up’ here means the removal
of prohibitive tariffs and the increasing access of Latin American economies
to international commodity and factor markets. De facto opening up would
be, then, confirmed by growing ratios of exports to GDP and by the increase
of real exports (that is, the value of exports adjusted for price changes) and
foreign investment per Latin American inhabitant.
Trade theories suggest a series of testable hypotheses with regard to the
consequences of opening up to the world economy for economic growth in
Latin American countries. As a result of getting rid of the trade burden a new
31 Coatsworth, ‘Obstacles ’, p. 84, estimated that the trade burden represented up to 3 per
cent of New Spain’s GDP. This figure was significantly higher than the one estimated for
the Thirteen Colonies in North America.
32 Centeno, ‘Blood and Debt ’ ; Coatsworth and Williamson, ‘Always Protectionist ? ’.
33 See Mar Rubio, ‘Protectionist but Globalized? Latin American Customs Duties and Trade
during the Pre-1914 Belle Epoque’ (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.
econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/967.pdf), for reservations about Coatsworth’s and
Williamson’s claims about the protectionist nature of tariffs in nineteenth-century Latin
America.
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‘ frontier ’ opened up in which land expanded at a rising cost in terms of other
resources.34 An expansion of trade would then be expected, as would an
increase in output due to better resource allocation. Terms of trade, that is,
the relative price of exports in terms of imports, might decline, according to
the Prebisch School, as Latin America exported primary goods and imported
manufactured produce, although, in the light of classical economists, the
opposite would occur.35 At the same time, changes in income distribution
should take place, with a tendency for within-country inequality to rise as the
reward to land, the abundant and less evenly distributed factor, improves
relative to labour.36 Finally, a worsening of the Latin American position in
the world economy can be predicted.37
Let us begin by examining the evolution of the net barter terms of trade
(NBTT), that is, the ratio of export to import prices, which provide a
measure of the purchasing power per unit of exports. If the NBTT had
turned in favour of Latin America, opening up to the international economy
as a consequence of colonial emancipation, it would have been beneficial
rather than harmful. Estimates for major Latin American countries are pre-
sented in Table 1. In Mexico the NBTT experienced a moderate improve-
ment between 1828 and 1881 (a growth of 1.4 per cent per year), and
probably added 3 per cent to GDP by 1860.38 Venezuela’s terms of trade
followed the Mexican pattern of stability over the period between 1830 and
1850, but then deteriorated in the early 1850s and recovered in the 1870s.39
34 Ronald Findlay, ‘ International Trade and Factor Mobility with an Endogenous Land
Frontier : Some General Equilibrium Implications of Christopher Columbus ’, in Wilfred J.
Ethier, Elhanan Helpman and J. Peter Neary (eds.), Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International
Trade : Essays in Honor of Ronald W. Jones (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 38–54.
35 The hypothesis of a deterioration of terms of trade has become a common concern in
studies of developing economies over space and time and hence deserves to be tested for
post-independence Latin America : see Rau´l Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin
America and its Principal Problems (New York, 1950) ; Yael S. Hadass and Jeffrey G.
Williamson, ‘Terms of Trade Shocks and Economic Performance, 1870–1940 : Prebisch
and Singer Revisited ’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 51, no. 3 (2003),
pp. 629–56.
36 Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Real Wages Inequality and Globalization in Latin America before
1940 ’, Revista de Historia Econo´mica, vol. 17 (1999) (special issue), pp. 101–42; John H.
Coatsworth, ‘Structures, Endowments, and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin
America ’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 40, no. 3 (2005), pp. 126–44, suggests a
positive association between inequality and per capita income after independence.
37 Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, ‘Globalization and the Inequality of Nations ’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, no. 4 (1995), pp. 857–80, posit that under gradually
falling transportation costs, such as during the 1820–1870 period, growing inequality would
occur.
38 Richard J. Salvucci, ‘The Mexican Terms of Trade, 1825–1883: Calculations and
Consequences ’ (1993) (mimeo).
39 Asdru´bal Baptista, Bases cuantitativas de la economı´a venezolana, 1830–1995 (Caracas, 1997),
pp. 86–90.
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In Chile, after a sharp rise and decline at the time of independence, stability
was the rule.40 Brazilian purchasing power per unit of exports increased
by three-quarters between 1826–30 and 1876–80.41 Colombian NBTT im-
proved as much as Brazil between the late 1830s and 1880.42 Linda and
Richard Salvucci were able (on the basis of Paul Gootenberg’s data) to esti-
mate that the net barter terms of trade of Peru increased by 47 per cent
between the 1830s and the early 1850s.43 Argentina’s terms of trade showed
an improvement that peaked in the late 1850s.44 The evolution of the NBTT
in Cuba presents the exception to the rule, as the island’s NBTT deteriorated
sharply between the early 1840s and 1860s.45 Thus, when Latin America
started opening up, cautiously and unevenly, its resource abundance did not
Table 1 Net Barter Terms of Trade in Latin American Countries, 1810–1880
[Average 1836–40=100]




1826/30 108 84 94 127 106
1831/35 100 95 105 107 125 107
1836/40 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1841/45 102 98 105 124 97 108 95
1846/50 86 101 102 109 104 104
1851/55 69 106 74 120 123 104
1856/60 62 100 80 157 115 165 105
1861/65 53 79 76 120 127 99
1866/70 56 94 71 127 89 105 97
1871/75 57 104 108 139 147 104
1876/80 57 116 112 178 173 108
Sources : Cuba: Salvucci and Salvucci, ‘Cuba ’, pp. 204–7; Mexico : Salvucci, ‘Mexican Terms
of Trade ’ ; Venezuela : Baptista, Bases cuantitativas, pp. 86–90 ; Colombia : Ocampo, Colombia,
p. 93 ; Brazil : Leff, Underdevelopment, vol. I, p. 82 ; Argentina : Newland, ‘Exports ’, pp. 412–3;
Chile : Braun et al., ‘Economı´a chilena ’.
40 Juan Braun, Matı´as Braun, Ignacio Briones and Jose´ Dı´az, ‘Economı´a chilena, 1810–1995 :
estadı´sticas histo´ricas ’, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile, Instituto de Economı´a,
Documento de Trabajo no. 187 (1998).
41 Nathaniel H. Leff, Underdevelopment and Development in Brazil (2 vols., London, 1982), vol. I,
p. 82.
42 Jose´ Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la economı´a mundial, 1830–1910 (Bogota´, 1984), p. 93.
43 Linda K. Salvucci and Richard J. Salvucci ‘Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade :
Old Theories, New Evidence ’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 31, no. 2 (2000), p. 216.
44 Carlos Newland, ‘Exports and Terms of Trade in Argentina, 1811–1870 ’, Bulletin of Latin
American Research, vol. 17, no. 3 (1998), p. 412.
45 Salvucci and Salvucci, ‘Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade ’, pp. 204–7. The
authors show that productivity improvements partly offset the decline in the relative price
of exports.
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bring about a deterioration of the terms of trade that would have hindered
Latin American growth. Newland’s argument for Argentina – that the
domestic terms of trade (that is, those perceived by the Latin American
population) ought to have improved more than the international terms of
trade as independence allowed merchants to trade directly in world markets,
colonial tariffs were repealed and the new tariffs were often lower – could
possibly be extended to other Latin American countries.46
Location mattered in the nineteenth century as the tyranny of distance
was a determining factor of trade – in particular, prior to the construction of
railways – despite the sharp reduction in ocean freight and insurance rates.
Freight rates from Antwerp to Rio de Janeiro in 1850 were only 40 per cent
of those prevailing in 1820, but freight rates from Antwerp to New York fell
even more, to one-fourth. Meanwhile, insurance rates were cut to one-half
and to one-third respectively for voyages from Rio and Buenos Aires to
Antwerp.47 Transport costs from Antwerp to Buenos Aires and Rio re-
mained relatively stable between 1850 and 1870 but those to Valparaiso, on
the Pacific Rim, fell by 40 per cent as a consequence of the convergence
of transport costs to the Pacific with those to the Atlantic coast of Latin
America’s Southern Cone.48
Geographical constraints imply that there would be different outcomes
from exposure to international trade across regions. Densely populated
coastal regions with a temperate climate would be at an advantage compared
to landlocked hinterlands in tropical areas, as migration and infrastructure
development become more difficult and incentives existed for coastal econ-
omies to impose costs on them.49 Landlocked economies such as Bolivia and
Paraguay, the interior regions of Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina,
and Andean countries such as Ecuador and Peru were clearly at a disadvan-
tage relative to coastal regions. In addition, countries on the Pacific Rim had
a transport cost disadvantage over those on the Atlantic coast. Table 2 pro-
vides some insights into overall transport costs that emphasise the import-
ance of internal costs of transportation.
Wide regional discrepancies in the degree of integration into the inter-
national economy would be expected. In post-independence Mexico the
liberalisation of factor markets was a gradual process which ended laws
46 Newland, ‘Exports ’ pp. 412–3.
47 Paul Scho¨ller, ‘L’e´volution se´culaire des taux de fret et d’assurance maritimes, 1819–1940 ’,
Bulletin de l’Institut de Recherches E´conomiques et Sociales, vol. 17, no. 5 (1951), pp. 519–57.
48 Scho¨ller, ‘L’evolution se´culaire ’, p. 543. Freights to Buenos Aires and Valparaiso became
equal by 1868 whereas, around 1850, transport costs to Chile were at least one-third higher
than to Buenos Aires.
49 See John L. Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew D. Mellinger, ‘Geography and Economic
Development ’, International Regional Science Review, vol. 22, no. 2 (1999), pp. 179–232.
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restricting immigration and capital inflows and brought an increase in
openness.50 Meanwhile in Peru, mercantilist policies remained in place. After
an episode of trade expansion up to the mid-1820s, fixed prices, taxation and
protectionism remained an obstacle to economic activity for decades. It was
only three decades later that the stimulus of the international demand (the
guano boom) opened up the country.51
Qualitative evidence on Central America suggests stagnation, but the
current value of imports from Britain almost doubled (while UK export
prices were practically halving) between two peaks (1826 and 1839) though
they declined afterwards.52 There were limited incentives to trade within
Central America as physical barriers implied high transport costs. Indepen-
dence brought a rupture in colonial commercial networks and procedures.
Links between regions of the Federation weakened as export orientation
increased. Together with political instability, these factors led to the creation
of five new countries in 1839. An exogenous shock also occurred as a
consequence of the US assimilation of California : new maritime routes
through the isthmus of Panama, together with the completion of the Panama
railway in 1855, led to a sharp decline in transport costs, increasing trade and
financial flows.53
Table 2. Transport Costs in Latin America c. 1842














Sources : Celia W. Brading, ‘Un ana´lisis comparativo del costo de la vida en diversas capitales
de Hispanoame´rica (1842) ’, Boletı´n Histo´rico de la Fundacio´n John Boulton, vol. 20 (1969),
pp. 229–66.
50 According to John H. Coatsworth, ‘The Decline of the Mexican Economy, 1800–1860 ’, in
Reinhard Liehr (ed.), Ame´rica Latina en la e´poca de Simo´n Bolı´var : la formacio´n de las economı´as
nacionales y los intereses econo´micos europeos, 1800–1850 (Berlin, 1989), p. 38, trade increased from
8.1 per cent of GDP in 1800 to 12.3 per cent by 1845.
51 Quiroz, ‘La independencia en el Peru´ ’, pp. 134–6 ; Gootenberg, Silver and Guano, pp. 161–2.
52 Lindo-Fuentes, ‘La independencia en Centroame´rica ’, p. 60.
53 Lindo-Fuentes, ‘La independencia en Centroame´rica ’, pp. 65–6.
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In Brazil, by contrast to Spanish America, independence did not involve a
shift in the direction of trade.54 The Buenos Aires economy profited from
the disappearance of colonial regulation that forced it to trade through the
metropolis. Rather than re-exporting silver from Alto Peru´, Buenos Aires
became an economy exporting livestock products. The main consequence of
independence there was the addition of new lands to the area under culti-
vation and the opening of the region to foreign trade.55
The hypothesis that the opening up of Latin American countries to the
international economy had a substantial but uneven impact can be empiri-
cally tested with evidence on the purchasing power of exports (current values
of exports deflated by the price of imports), also known as the income terms
of trade, normalised by the size of each country’s population in order to
capture its relative importance (Table 3).56 Location conditioned the im-
portance of trade, with the Southern Cone and the Caribbean ahead of the
rest in terms of both levels and growth rates. Significant increases in the
relative size of trade are also noticeable for Brazil, Colombia and Peru. The
figures at a regional level, which are highly conjectural, suggest that per capita
exports increased in Latin America by 50 per cent over these 40 years. For
the group of eight countries for which more reliable information is available
(LA8 in Table 3), the purchasing power of exports per inhabitant trebled
over the period from 1830 to 1870, which implies an average annual rate of
growth of 2.8 per cent. Nonetheless, the dispersion in countries’ behaviour
is, perhaps, the most remarkable feature of Table 3, with Cuba’s per capita
exports being almost three times the Latin American average in 1830, while
Peru only represented one-tenth of it.57
Evidence from more reliable national sources on the purchasing power of
exports (in terms of imports) confirms these findings. Income terms of trade
improved in Cuba at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent between 1826/30 and
1870/74, while in Mexico its cumulative rate of variation was 3.5 per cent
between 1828/30 and 1872/74.58 In Colombia they grew at 4 per cent an-
nually between 1834/39 and 1870/75, while in Venezuela the annual rate was
54 Stephen H. Haber and Herbert S. Klein, ‘Las consecuencias econo´micas de la in-
dependencia brasilen˜a ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.), La independencia
americana, pp. 153–8.
55 Amaral, ‘Del mercantilismo a la libertad ’, p. 208.
56 The price index of the United Kingdom’s exports has been employed to deflate current
exports and comes from Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988),
p. 526. The result provides a measure of the purchasing power of Latin American exports
as the United Kingdom was the main trading partner of the new republics. See Leff,
Underdevelopment, vol. I, p. 80, for a similar approach.
57 The relative dispersion of per capita exports, as measured by the coefficient of variation,
fell, however, after 1850.
58 Salvucci and Salvucci, ‘Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade ’, pp. 197–222.
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3.3 per cent between 1831/5 and 1871/75.59 In Brazil income terms of trade
increased at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent over 1822/31–1862/71.60 Finally,
in the Southern Cone, Argentina’s purchasing power of exports grew at a
yearly rate of 5.5 per cent between 1821/25 and 1866/70, while Chile’s did so
at 6.2 per cent annually over the period between 1821/25 and 1871/75.61 An
alternative view, that of the purchasing power of Latin American exports to
Table 3. Purchasing Power of Exports per Capita
[1880 Pounds Sterling]
Annual Growth Rates (%)
1830 1850 1870 1830–1850 1830–1870
Argentina 0.26 2.09 2.50 10.4 5.6
Bolivia 1.11 1.30
Brazil 0.58 1.01 1.29 2.8 2.0
Chile 0.60 1.60 2.15 4.9 3.2
Colombia 0.33 0.38 1.00 0.8 2.8
Costa Rica 2.32 3.20
Cuba 2.35 4.52 6.93 3.3 2.7
Dominican R. 0.70 0.75
Ecuador 0.40 0.62
El Salvador 0.66 1.10
Guatemala 0.34 0.37
Honduras 1.00 0.54
Mexico 0.23 0.65 0.35 5.1 1.0
Nicaragua 0.75 0.53
Paraguay 0.26 1.08
Peru 0.09 0.76 1.52 10.8 7.1
Uruguay 11.19 7.04
Venezuela 0.40 0.67 0.78 2.5 1.7
TOTAL 0.85 1.07 1.34 1.1 1.1
LA8 0.45 1.07 1.38 4.3 2.8
Note : Current values deflated with the British export price index. LA8 includes Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
Sources : For 1830 exports are from Paul Bairoch and Bouda Etemad, Structure par produits des
exportations du Tiers-Monde 1830–1937 (Geneva, 1985), p. 72, and population, from sources in
Table 6 ; for 1850 and 1870, exports come from Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, pp. 21,
412–3, converted into pounds sterling with Lawrence H. Officer, ‘Exchange rate between the
United States dollar and the British pound, 1791–2000 ’., Economic History Services, EH.Net,
2001,<http://www.eh.net/hmit/exchangerates/pound.php>. The British export price in-
dex comes from Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 526.
59 Ocampo, Colombia, p. 98 ; Baptista, Bases cuantitativas, pp. 86–90.
60 Leff, Underdevelopment, vol. I, p. 80.
61 Newland, ‘Exports ’, pp. 409–16; Braun et al., ‘Economı´a chilena ’.
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Britain, offers similar results with an annual rate of growth of 5.1 per cent
between 1824/26 and 1874/76.62
Table 4 shows an alternative measure of the size of the trade sector, the
exports/GDP ratio, for a smaller group of countries. Following Victor
Bulmer-Thomas’s approach, I have computed the ratio of per capita exports
to GDP per head at current prices.63 This method produces trade ratios in
which GDP is adjusted for differences in the price level across countries in a
given benchmark year, so-called ‘ real ’ GDP. This means that, in the case of
developing countries such those of Latin America, ‘ real ’ GDP is larger than
Table 4. Exports/GDP Ratios in Latin America, 1830–1870 (%)
Panel A. Exports/ ‘real ’ GDP
1830 1850 1870
Argentina 1.9 9.9 9.1
Brazil 8.8 11.5 12.6
Chile 9.6 13.0 11.0
Colombia 8.0 7.0 11.6
Cuba 37.6 48.1 55.1
Mexico 3.3 6.6 3.3
Uruguay 65.6 24.9
Venezuela 9.2 7.3 9.9
LA8 7.2 12.0 11.8
Panel B. Exports/‘nominal ’ GDP
1830 1850 1870
Argentina 1.3 6.7 6.1
Brazil 15.8 20.5 22.6
Chile 12.2 16.4 14.0
Colombia 15.9 13.8 22.9
Cuba 60.4 77.3 88.5
Mexico 5.8 11.6 5.7
Uruguay 92.5 35.1
Venezuela 10.8 8.5 11.5
LA8 11.6 19.3 19.0
Sources : Per capita exports from the sources cited in Table 3 ; per capita GDP (expressed in
1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) is from Table 6, converted into current prices with the US
implicit GDP deflator from Louis Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, ‘The Annual Real and
Nominal GDP for the United States, 1789 – Present. ’ Economic History Services, April 2002,
<http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp>. ‘Nominal ’ GDP per head is calculated from ‘real ’ GDP
multiplied by the price level (PL), in other words the ratio of the purchasing power parity
exchange rate to the trading exchange rate, from United Nations, World Comparisons of
Purchasing Power and Real Product for 1980 (New York, 1987). For Cuba, the population-weighted
average PL has been used, as for LA8.
62 Computed from Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester,
1979), and Mitchell, British Historical Statistics.
63 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, p. 419.
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‘nominal ’ GDP (that is, the figure obtained by converting the value of
GDP in domestic currency into dollars at the trading exchange rate). This is
because non-tradeables have lower aggregate price levels in developing
countries than in advanced nations. Thus, the resulting trade ratios derived
with ‘ real ’ GDP (Table 4, Panel A) are usually lower than those computed
with ‘nominal ’ GDP.64 If we wish to obtain figures comparable to those
currently used in the literature, that is, calculated with ‘nominal ’ GDP, the
level of ‘ real ’ GDP ought to be adjusted to the price level of each particular
country at the benchmark year (Table 4, Panel B).
On average, the relative weight of foreign trade increased by two-thirds
between 1830 and 1870. As would be expected, the relative weight of trade is
inversely proportional to the country’s size. Thus, Cuba and Uruguay appear
as very open countries, while the opposite is true of Mexico. However this is
not the case of Brazil. Meanwhile, the River Plate was the region that in-
creased its exposure to the international economy most between 1830 and
1850.
The inflow of British capital into Latin America confirms the uneven but
significant integration of Latin American countries into the international
capital market (Table 5).65 The growth of real foreign investment per in-
habitant provides another measure of openness for the region. Over the half-
century after independence, the purchasing power of British investment per
inhabitant increased six-fold, at an average annual rate of growth of 3.7 per
cent. The purchasing power of British investment per capita in 1865 was two
and a half times the level in 1825 but it really took off after 1865, a
phenomenon linked to government loans and, to a lesser extent, associated
with the shift of foreign investment toward railway construction and public
utilities.66 The dispersion across countries (which declined between 1825 and
1865 but increased thereafter) stands out ; by 1875 British capital was con-
centrated in the River Plate, Peru and Central America.
64 See the discussion in John R. Hanson II, ‘Exports Shares in the European Periphery and
the Third World before World War I : Questionable Data, Facile Analogies ’, Explorations in
Economic History, vol. 23, no. 1 (1986), pp. 85–99.
65 British investment was also deflated by the price of UK exports, as investment was used (at
least in part) for the purchase of capital goods and raw materials from Great Britain. British
investment amounted to more than three times French investments and more than four
times US investments in Latin America by 1913 (computed from figures in Carlos Marichal
(ed.), Las inversiones extranjeras en Ame´rica Latina, 1850–1930 : nuevos debates y problemas en historia
econo´mica comparada (Me´xico, 1995), Appendix).
66 Irving Stone, ‘British Direct and Portfolio Investment in Latin America before 1914’,
Journal of Economic History, vol. 37, no. 3 (1977), pp. 690–722. A significant share of the
increase in government debt probably represented the funding of defaulted interest ob-
ligations rather than new capital : see Carlos Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin
America : From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820–1930 (Princeton, 1989).
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The opening up of Latin America to the international economy has been
associated with a widening of income differences within national boundaries
and across countries. Little evidence is available on the former for the pre-
1870 period, although Argentina represents an exception. Carlos Newland
and Javier Ortiz have shown that the expansion in the pastoral sector re-
sulting from improved terms of trade increased the rewards to capital and
land, the most intensively used factors, while the farming sector contracted
and the returns of its intensive factor, labour, declined, as confirmed by the
drop in nominal wages.67 A redistribution of income in favour of owners of
capital and land (the estancieros) at the expense of workers took place, an
empirical confirmation of the Stolper-Samuelson theoretical predictions.68
To summarise, release from the colonial trade burden had net gains for the
economies of Latin America, as the evolution of the quantities and prices of
Table 5. Purchasing Power of British Investment per capita
[1880 Pounds Sterling]
Annual Growth Rates (%)
1825 1865 1875 1825–1865 1825–1875
Argentina 0.90 1.29 8.83 0.9 4.6
Bolivia 0.93
Brazil 0.48 1.66 2.41 3.1 3.2
Chile 0.48 1.31 4.01 2.5 4.3








Mexico 0.61 2.16 2.57 3.2 2.9
Nicaragua 0.10 0.30
Paraguay 5.77
Peru 0.72 1.16 11.18 1.2 5.5
Uruguay 3.66 18.18
Venezuela 2.06 3.46
TOTAL 0.56 1.45 3.50 2.4 3.7
Note : Current values deflated with the British export price index.
Sources : Investment : Stone, ‘British Direct and Portfolio Investment ’, pp. 690–722 ; British
export price index : Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 526.
67 Carlos Newland and Javier Ortiz, ‘The Economic Consequences of Argentine
Independence ’, Cuadernos de Economı´a, no. 115 (2001), pp. 275–90.
68 See also A. Leticia Arroyo Abad, ‘ Inequality in a Small Open Economy: Latin America in
the 19th Century ’, paper presented at the Seventh Conference of the European Historical
Economics Society (Lund, 2007).
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exported goods suggests. Although trade did not have the strength to pull
the economy along as an episode of export-led growth, it can be argued that,
when it was not hindered by geographic and institutional barriers, it
facilitated growth.69 Trade in nineteenth-century Latin America seems to
have been, in most national cases, a handmaiden of growth.70 Hence, recent
claims by Robert Bates, John Coatsworth and Jeffrey Williamson that ‘Latin
America failed to exploit the world trade boom between 1820 and 1870
[because of its] aggressive anti-trade policies ’, and that, in the early nine-
teenth century, ‘ the growth rates of exports per capita were below 1 per cent
per annum’, are at odds with the empirical evidence presented here. This is
also the case with their argument that foreign investment was just an
‘ephemeral investment cycle in the early to mid 1820s ’.71
Weighing up Aggregate Performance in the Post-Independence Era
Evidence on aggregate economic performance across countries shows a wide
variance. This paper provides estimates and conjectures for eight countries,
based on national authors.72 In the core of the colonial empire, Mexico and
Peru, independence did not deliver the conditions for sustained economic
growth. Wartime destruction of fixed capital, the flight of financial capital,
mining depression, fiscal mismanagement and political turmoil all contributed
negatively to growth. Among the explanatory hypotheses for sluggish per-
formance in Mexico and Peru are political instability and the decline in silver
production, which did not recover until mid-nineteenth century, both as a
result of these countries’ economic policies and changes in the international
market for mercury.73
69 The export-led growth approach has been rejected for Brazil and Mexico by Leff,
Underdevelopment, and Luis Cata˜o, ‘The Failure of Export-Led Growth in Brazil and Mexico,
c. 1870–1930 ’, University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, Research Papers
No. 31 (1992).
70 See Irving B. Kravis, ‘Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth: Similarities between the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries ’, Economic Journal, vol. 80, no. 323 (1970), pp. 850–72.
The view of D. C. M. Platt, ‘Dependency in Nineteenth-Century Latin America : An
Historian Objects ’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 15, no. 1 (1980), pp. 113–30, that the
break with Spain reintroduced ‘an unwelcome half century of independence ’ from foreign
trade and finance’ thus seems to be exaggerated.
71 Bates, Coatsworth and Williamson, ‘Lost Decades ’.
72 Maddison, World Economy, only provides guesstimates for two countries (Brazil and
Mexico) over 1820–70, which are actually those whose rates of growth are the lowest.
Likewise, John H. Coatsworth, ‘Economic and Institutional Trajectories in Nineteenth-
Century Latin America ’, in John H. Coatsworth and Alan M. Taylor (eds.), Latin America
and the World Economy since 1800 (Cambridge, MA, 1998), pp. 23–54, considers these two
countries and Cuba.
73 Ponzio, ‘Looking at the Dark Side ’. Quiroz, ‘La independencia en el Peru´ ’, pp. 129–33,
143; Dobado and Marrero, ‘Minerı´a ’.
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Quantitative guesses are available for Mexico’s economic performance.
According to Coatsworth, output per head fell at a yearly rate of nearlyx0.6
per cent between 1800 and 1860.74 Salvucci, in turn, pointed out that pro-
longed stagnation or even the decline of per capita income are appropriate
depictions of Mexican economic performance over the period between 1800
and 1840.75 More recently Coatsworth has conceded that, after a decline
during the independence wars, a very mild recovery (0.2 per cent per year)
occurred between 1820 and 1845.76 Ernest Sa´nchez Santiro´ has gone further
in this revision by sustaining that economic growth and population expan-
sion occurred between 1820 and the mid-1850s, followed by stagnation and
even decline until 1870.77
Slave economies offer a distinct and different behaviour. They did not
undergo a deep political and institutional transformation. Cuba remained
loyal to Spain and experienced sustained progress until 1860.78 Antonio
Santamarı´a’s recent estimates point to an annual growth rate of around 1 per
cent for real per capita GDP between 1790 and 1860.79 Low rates of growth
in a context of free trade, limited structural change, and political stability
characterised the case of Brazil.80
Meanwhile, in the former Viceroyalty of New Granada, output per head
in Venezuela experienced a rise up to the middle of the nineteenth century
and stagnated during its central decades.81 In Colombia, stability in the level
74 Computed from Coatsworth, ‘Decline ’, p. 41. Between 1800 and 1877 a x0.2 per cent
annual decline would have taken place. Maddison,World Economy, p. 191, in turn, assumed a
smaller drop than Coatsworth over the period between 1820 and 1870. This view is shared
by Enrique Ca´rdenas, ‘A Macroeconomic Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Mexico ’,
in Haber (ed.), How Latin America Fell Behind, pp. 65–92.
75 Richard J. Salvucci, ‘Mexican National Income in the Era of Independence, 1800–1840 ’, in
Haber (ed.), How Latin America Fell Behind, pp. 234–5.
76 John H. Coatsworth, ‘Mexico ’, in Joel Mokyr (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic
History (New York, 2003), vol. III, pp. 501–7; also John H. Coatsworth, ‘Structures,
Endowments, and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin America ’, Latin American
Research Review, vol. 40, no. 3 (2005), pp. 126–44.
77 Ernest Sa´nchez Santiro´, ‘El desempen˜o de la economı´a mexicana tras la independencia,
1821–1870 : nuevas evidencias e interpretaciones ’, paper presented at the conference,
‘Obsta´culos al crecimiento econo´mico en Hispanoame´rica y Espan˜a, 1790–1850 ’,
Fundacio´n Ramo´n Areces, Madrid, May 2007.
78 Pedro Fraile, Richard J. Salvucci and Linda K. Salvucci, ‘El caso cubano: exportaciones e
independencia ’, in Prados de la Escosura and Amaral (eds.), La independencia americana,
pp. 80–101.
79 Antonio Santamarı´a, ‘Las cuentas nacionales de Cuba, 1690–2005 ’ (mimeo, 2005). A
similar rate of growth is obtained for 1830–60.
80 Leff, Underdevelopment, vol. I, p. 33, suggested that Brazil experienced no growth in the early
nineteenth century but, to my knowledge, no quantitative assessment of aggregate per-
formance is available for this period.
81 Baptista, Bases cuantitativas, pp. 28, 58. Output per head grew at a yearly rate of 2.2 per cent
between 1830 and 1850, but this figure falls to 0.9 per cent when it is computed between
1830 and 1870.
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of income per head between 1820 and 1850 was followed by strong
growth, giving an average yearly growth rate of 0.5 per cent between 1820
and 1870.82
Economies in the Southern Cone show, in turn, sustained economic
progress after independence. ChileanGDPper head grew at 1.5 per cent a year
between 1810 and 1870, though most of the improvement took place after
1830.83 Available economic indicators suggest fast growth in the Buenos
Aires region, which translated into an improvement in Argentina’s per capita
income. Increases in population and the labour force, urbanisation, and a
significant rise of total factor productivity in livestock production are among
the distinctive features of the River Plate region after independence.84 The
per capita agricultural output of the Argentine littoral grew at 2 per cent per
year between 1825 and 1865.85 If we assume that this sector was represen-
tative of the littoral’s economy as a whole, while in Argentina’s interior
provinces per capita income stagnated, a population-weighted rate of growth
of 0.8 per cent per year would result for per capita GDP.86 It does not seem
far-fetched to assume that Uruguay’s behaviour was rather similar to that on
the Argentine side of the River Plate.87
The fragmented evidence and conjectures for each country can be used to
derive comparative levels of per capita income for Latin America during the
1820–1870 period. The International Comparisons Project (ICP) has pro-
duced levels of per capita GDP, adjusted for its purchasing power parity
(PPP), that is, for differences in national price levels, for a large sample
of countries at different benchmark years that are expressed in so called
‘ international ’ dollars. ICP benchmark levels for 1990 have been projected
with national indices of per capita income at constant prices by Angus
82 Kalmanovitz and Lo´pez Rivera, Ingreso colombiano, p. 15. These authors rely on current price
estimates as they assume price stability up to 1870.
83 Jose´ Dı´az, Rolf Lu¨ders, and Gert Wagner, ‘Economı´a Chilena 1810–2000 : producto total y
sectorial, una nueva mirada ’, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile, Instituto de
Economı´a, Documento de trabajo no. 315 (2007), p. 57.
84 Carlos Newland, ‘Economic Development and Population Change : Argentina,
1810–1870 ’, in John H. Coatsworth and Alan M. Taylor (eds.), Latin America and the World
Economy Since 1800 (Cambridge, MA, 1998), pp. 207–22; Newland, ‘Exports ’ ; Carlos
Newland and Barry Poulson, ‘Purely Animal : Pastoral Production and Early Argentine
Economic Growth, 1825–1865’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 35, no. 3 (1998),
pp. 325–45.
85 Newland and Poulson, ‘Purely Animal ’, p. 328 ; Newland, ‘Economic Development ’,
p. 212.
86 Population figures come from Newland, ‘Economic Development ’, p. 218.
87 Assuming that Uruguay’s per capita GDP grew in the same way as Argentina’s between
1820 and 1870, including the backward interior provinces, would probably lead to an
underestimate. Thus, I arbitrarily assumed that Uruguay evolved in the same way as
Argentina a whole between 1820 and 1850, and in the same way as Argentina’s littoral
between 1850 and 1870.
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Maddison to produce historical series of real GDP per head for a large number
of countries.88 I followed a similar procedure for Latin American countries
and projected backwards per capita GDP levels for 1990 (in Geary-Khamis
dollars)89with volume indices of product per head obtained from the available
national estimates and conjectures (Table 6). For the rest of the world I used
Angus Maddison’s figures. Moreover, by weighting each country’s per capita
GDP level by its share in Latin American population, an aggregate figure can
be derived for the entire region. The implicit yearly growth for Latin
America’s income per head between 1820 and 1870 is 0.5 per cent, a moderate
though respectable rate in its historical context, which provides a more op-
timistic view of the post-independence performance than the recent sug-
gestion of Bates et al. that per capita GDP grew at 0.07 percent per year, ‘or,
adjusting for the dubious quality of the data, about zero ’.90 A caveat is,
nonetheless, necessary : the high variance of national estimates for per capita
income (the coefficient of variation for a group of eight countries was 0.42
in 1820 and went up to 0.53 in 1870) renders any average figure for Latin
America questionable.
The historical literature has employed the United States as the yardstick to
measure Latin American achievements over the nineteenth century.91 A
glance at the evolution of per capita income levels in Table 6 suggests that,
compared with the United States, Latin America experienced a sustained
decline over the period 1820–1870. A country by country analysis, though,
appears more informative : while the position of Mexico and Brazil relative to
the United States halved, Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela experienced only
moderate decline, and Chile and Uruguay kept their positions roughly un-
altered.
However, the fact that by 1820 output per head in the United States was
practically double that of Latin American raises the question of whether the
United States is an appropriate comparator.92 Focusing exclusively on the
contrast with the United States inevitably leads to a negative assessment of
88 Maddison, World Economy.
89 That is, so-called ‘ international dollars ’ which are adjusted for differences in national price
levels.
90 Bates et al., ‘Lost Decades ’. They rely on Maddison’s World Economy guesstimates. It is
worth stressing, however, that, in Table 6, the lowest rates of growth for GDP per head
between 1820 and 1870 correspond to those countries with less reliable GDP figures,
Brazil and Mexico. If the exceptional cases of Brazil and Cuba are excluded, per capita
GDP growth would reach 0.6 per cent between 1820 and 1870.
91 See Prados de la Escosura, ‘Economic Consequences ’.
92 The United States represents an exceptional case during the nineteenth century, growing
faster in terms of GDP per head than any other region in the world, with the exception of
the ‘European offshoots ’ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) : see Maddison, World
Economy.
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Table 6. Comparative GDP per Head, 1820–1870
(Expressed in 1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)
Annual Growth (%)
1820 1870 1820–1870 1820 1870
(U.S.=1)
Argentina 1249 1837 0.8 0.99 0.75
Brazil 652 680 0.1 0.52 0.28
Chile 607 1295 1.5 0.48 0.53
Colombia 425 539 0.5 0.34 0.22
Cuba 583 838 0.7 0.46 0.34
Mexico 693 720 0.1 0.55 0.29
Uruguay 1004 1880 1.3 0.80 0.77
Venezuela 347 529 0.8 0.28 0.22
Latin America (average) (8) 648 813 0.5 0.52 0.33
Africa 420 500 0.3 0.33 0.20
China 600 530 x0.2 0.48 0.22
India 533 533 0.0 0.42 0.22
Japan 669 737 0.2 0.53 0.30
East Asia (11) 599 647 0.2 0.48 0.26
Eastern Europe 683 937 0.6 0.54 0.38
Former USSR 688 943 0.6 0.55 0.39
Western Europe (12) 1245 2088 1.0 0.99 0.85
West European Periphery (4) 925 1237 0.6 0.74 0.51
United States 1257 2445 1.3 1.00 1.00
World 687 910 0.6 0.55 0.37
Note : For supra-national entities, population weighted averages are used. Numbers in brackets correspond
to the number of countries included.
Sources : Maddison, World Economy, p. 642, except for Latin America. Volume indices of Latin American
per capita GDP were spliced with Maddison’s per capita GDP levels for 1990, expressed in 1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars.
Argentina: Gerardo Della Paolera, Alan M. Taylor and Carlos Bo´zolli, ‘Historical Statistics ’, in
Gerardo Della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (eds.), A New Economic History of Argentina (Cambridge, 2003),
pp. 376–85 (plus CD-Rom), GDP, 1884–1990, spliced with Roberto Corte´s Conde, La economı´a argentina en
el largo plazo (Buenos Aires, 1997), from 1875 onwards. I assumed the level for 1870 was identical to that of
1875. Newland and Poulson, ‘Purely Animal ’, p. 328, estimated that Argentina’s littoral agricultural output
per head grew at 2 per cent per year between 1825 and 1865. I have assumed that this sector was
representative of the littoral economy as a whole, and that there was no per capita growth in Argentina’s
interior provinces. A population-weighted average suggests an annual rate of growth of per capita GDP of
0.8 per cent. Population data comes from Newland, ‘Economic Development’, pp. 212 and 218.
Brazil : GDP, Richard W. Goldsmith, Brasil 1850–1984 : Desenvolvimento financeiro sob um se´culo de inflac¸ao (Sao
Paulo, 1986), 1850–1980. Zero per capita income growth for the early nineteenth century as suggested by
Leff, Underdevelopment and Development, vol. I, p. 33, was adopted. A lower initial level and, subsequently, a
higher growth rate would result if the assumption of Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy,
1820–1992 (Paris, 1995), p. 143, that per capita income growth in the 1820–50 period grew at the same pace
as in 1850–1913 were accepted.
Chile : Dı´az, Lu¨ders and Wagner, ‘Economı´a chilena’, p. 57.
Colombia: Kalmanovitz and Lo´pez Rivera, ‘ Ingreso colombiano, 1820–1905; then, GRECO [Grupo
de Estudios de Crecimiento Econo´mico], El crecimiento econo´mico colombiano en el siglo XX (Bogota´, 2002).
Cuba: Santamarı´a, ‘Cuentas nacionales ’.
Mexico: Coatsworth, ‘Decline ’, p. 41, for the nineteenth century. Following Coatsworth, ‘Mexico’,
p. 502, I accepted a mild rise in per capita GDP over the 1820–1845 period; INEGI, Estadı´sticas Histo´ricas
de Me´xico, (Me´xico DF, 1995), after 1896.
Uruguay : Luis Be´rtola y asociados, El PBI de Uruguay 1870–1936 y otras estimaciones (Montevideo, 1998).
I assumed that Uruguay evolved at the same rate as Argentina’s littoral between 1850 and 1870, and at the
same rate as Argentina as a whole over the 1820–50 period.
Venezuela : Baptista, Bases cuantitativas, pp. 28, 58.
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Table 7. Per Capita GDP at the Time of Colonial Independence








Swaziland 1968 UK 1588 1
Congo 1960 France 1523 2
Malaysia 1957 UK 1455 3
Morocco 1956 France 1451 4
Senegal 1959 France 1448 5
Algeria 1962 France 1433 6
Mozambique 1975 Portugal 1404 7
Somalia 1960 Italy 1277 8
Co`te d’Ivoire 1960 France 1256 9
Argentina 1816 Spain 1249 10
Ghana 1957 UK 1241 11
Tunisia 1956 France 1223 12
U.S.A. 1776 UK 1166 13
Sri Lanka 1948 UK 1159 14
Madagascar 1960 France 1125 15
Angola 1975 Portugal 1074 16
Uruguay* 1816 Spain 1004 17
Zambia 1964 UK 996 18
Zimbabwe 1965 UK 984 19
Benin 1960 France 978 20
Sudan 1956 UK 976 21
Niger 1960 France 940 22
Central African 1960 France 925 23
Guinea-Bissau 1975 Portugal 925 24
Egypt 1922 UK 902 25
Sierra Leone 1961 UK 858 26
Nigeria 1960 UK 854 27
Gambia 1965 UK 846 28
Cameroon 1960 France 832 29
Indonesia 1949 Netherlands 797 30
Congo Dem. Rep. 1960 Belgium 755 31
Vietnam 1954 France 732 32
Kenya 1963 UK 714 33
Togo 1960 France 698 34
Rwanda 1962 Belgium 695 35
Uganda 1962 UK 694 36
Mexico 1821 Spain 693 37
Brazil 1822 Portugal 652 38
Philippines 1946 USA 646 39
Pakistan 1947 UK 643 40
Laos 1954 France 642 41
Mauritania 1960 France 625 42
India 1947 UK 618 43
Burkina Faso 1960 France 609 44
Chile 1818 Spain 607 45
Cuba** 1898 Spain 583 46
Cambodia 1954 France 582 47
Lesotho 1966 UK 577 48
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Latin America’s economic and political behaviour after independence.93
Furthermore, such a comparison diverts attention from the real issue : the
extent to which Latin America underperformed in terms of its own potential.
Falling behind the United States does not necessarily imply that development
opportunities were missed by the new Latin American republics. Lower
human capital to labour ratios (implied by life expectancy and literacy rates)
and disparate geographical conditions (average temperature, distance to the
sea, and latitude) imply different steady states for Anglo-America and Latin
America.94 Moreover, the insistence of historians on the different institutional
settings in Anglo-America and Latin America (the colonial heritage, the in-









Chad 1960 France 569 49
Bangladesh 1947 UK 540 50
Mali 1959 France 530 51
Cape Verde 1975 Portugal 525 52
Tanzania 1964 UK 494 53
Botswana 1966 UK 473 54
Colombia 1819 Spain 425 55
Burma 1948 UK 396 57
Guinea 1958 France 368 58
Malawi 1964 UK 359 59
Venezuela 1819 Spain 347 60
Note : Per capita GDP are for c. 1820 in the case of Latin American countries.
* Uruguay became an independent country in 1828. Before that it was part of the River Plate
Republic.
** Although Cuba became independent in 1898, the level of GDP per head corresponds here
to c. 1820.
Sources : Per capita GDP, Latin America, Table 6 ; Others are from Maddison, World Economy,
pp. 552–6, 598–603.
93 This used to be the case in European economic history, when countries’ success or failure
was assessed according to the extent they replicated the British experience of industrialis-
ation : see Patrick K. O’Brien and C¸aglar Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France,
1780–1914 : Two Paths to the Twentieth Century (London, 1978).
94 Coatsworth, ‘Economic and Institutional Trajectories ’ ; Paul Collier and Jan Willem
Gunning, ‘Explaining African Economic Performance ’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.
37, no. 1 (1999), pp. 64–111; Leandro Prados de la Escosura, ‘ Improving the Human
Development Index : Historical Estimates ’, Universidad Carlos III (unpublished manu-
script) ; Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘Tropical Underdevelopment ’, NBER Working Paper Series no.
8119 (2001) ; John W. McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘ Institutions and Geography :
Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) ’, NBER Working Paper Series
8114 (2001).
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rights) suggest that it would be unrealistic to expect a similar performance in
Latin America to that of the United States in the decades to come.95
The relevant task, then, would be to identify the feasible counterfactual
scenarios that might have led to higher paths of growth. While this is a most
difficult empirical challenge at present, it can be observed that, in addition to
having been colonies of European powers, a non-negligible group of coun-
tries in Asia and Africa shared, at the time of their independence in the 1950s
and 1960s, some of the initial conditions of the new Latin American re-
publics in the 1820s : high fertility rates, high land-labour ratios, and high
transport costs, low human capital endowment, as well as exogenous factors
such as climate and location.96 Moreover, the experience of indirect colonial
governance, the creation of a modern state from scratch, the fragmentation
of former colonies, and the failure to implement modern constitutions in-
herited from the metropolis are common features of post-independence
Latin America and Africa.97 On top of that, their levels of GDP per capita at
the time of independence are comparable. Former colonies have been
ranked in Table 7 according to their GDP per head at the time of emanci-
pation.98 In this sample, Latin American countries are concentrated in the
fourth and fifth quintiles, except for the River Plate which, like the United
States, belongs to the top quintile.99 It appears, then, that at the time of
independence the new Latin American republics were closer in terms of per
capita income to former European colonies in Asia and in Africa than to the
United States. Thus, it can be suggested that the contrast with former
European colonies in Asia and Africa may provide a useful comparator for
post-colonial performance in Latin America. In fact, when Latin America’s
performance is compared with that of world regions other than the United
States during the half-century after independence the picture changes dra-
matically. Although it fell behind a handful of countries in Western Europe
Latin American income per head kept pace with the European periphery and
grew faster than Asia and Africa.
95 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge,
1990), p. 102 ; Engerman and Sokoloff, ‘Factor Endowments ’, pp. 260–304; North et al.,
‘Order, Disorder ’, p. 19
96 Prados de la Escosura, ‘Human Development Index ’ ; Sachs, ‘Tropical Under-
development ’ ; McArthur and Sachs, ‘ Institutions and Geography ’.
97 Prados de la Escosura, ‘Economic Consequences ’.
98 Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa and Singapore have been excluded from the
sample as they represent exceptional cases with per capita income levels ranging between
2,700 and 4,200 1990 Geary-Khamis US dollars.
99 While the per capita income figures for African and Asian countries correspond to the date
of independence, in the case of Latin America estimates figures c. 1820 are used. Cuba,
however, became independent in 1898. If Cuba’s per capita income in 1898 (1,030 1990
Geary-Khamis US dollars) were used in the comparison, she would belong to the second
quintile.
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Concluding Remarks
The goal of this article has been to challenge current assessments of Latin
American economic performance between emancipation from Spain around
1820 and the beginning of the first wave of globalisation, around 1870. More
specifically it questions the value of the United States as the only yardstick to
evaluate Latin America, which supports the depiction of the half-century
following independence as ‘ lost decades ’. Such an approach implies that the
path followed by the United States provided a feasible counterfactual for
Latin America and, thus, implicitly assumes that factor proportions and in-
stitutions, as well as policies, were similar across the Americas. The evidence
assembled in this paper suggests that falling behind the United States does
not necessarily imply that development opportunities were missed by the
new Latin American republics. As Stanley and Barbara Stein pointed out :
The existence of a huge, under-populated virgin land of extraordinary resource
endowment directly facing Europe and enjoying a climate comparable to that of
Europe represented a potentiality for development which existed nowhere else in
the New World.100
The challenge remains to establishwhetherLatinAmerica under-performed
in terms of its own potential. As a feasible alternative, a systematic com-
parison with regions that shared its features at the time of their respective
independence from European colonial powers (namely, similar geographical
conditions and factor endowments, and comparable levels of income per
head) is proposed.
The conventional periodisation of Latin American economic history,
which sees a clear discontinuity in the early nineteenth century before growth
accelerated in its final decades, is also challenged here. Although the short-
run effects of independence on economic performance were clearly negative,
a more benign picture emerges when we look back at the post-independence
era over half a century. The economic discontinuity caused by independence
lasted for less time than is usually assumed, especially by those who view
these as ‘ lost decades ’. A more gradual picture can be put forward, with a
dramatic drop in income per head during the early revolutionary years, fol-
lowed by a moderate but sustained growth in the half-century after complete
independence, and then an acceleration that placed Latin American countries
among the best performers in the world economy during the heyday of the
first globalisation.101
100 Stanley and Barbara Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America : Essays on Economic
Dependence in Perspective (New York, 1970), p. 128.
101 The growth of per capita GDP trebled (up to 1.5 per cent annually) between 1870 and
1913 for the eight-country sample considered here. On average, the position relative to the
United States remained stable at a time in which the United States was achieving its
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Independence exacerbated regional disparities. Coatsworth is probably
right when he sees ‘ the pace of nineteenth-century institutional moderniza-
tion’ as a ‘good predictor of long term economic performance’.102 Insti-
tutional modernisation seems to have occurred earlier and faster in the new
republics that had not been at the core of the Spanish empire. Moreover,
geography mattered, and location and access to the sea conditioned coun-
tries’ access to world commodity and factor markets and, consequently, their
potential for long term growth.
On the whole, however, real product per head grew in Latin America
between 1820 and 1870 at a similar rate to the global average, matching that
of the European periphery and proving far higher than that occurring in Asia
and Africa. ‘Lost decades ’ seems to be an inadequate description of aggregate
performance in post-independence Latin America.
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secunda´rio ao crescimento. Disparidades regionais aumentaram apo´s as in-
dependeˆncias, consequentemente generalizac¸o˜es a respeito do comportamento da
regia˜o a longo prazo na˜o sa˜o simples. Entretanto a renda per capita aumentou, em
me´dia, na Ame´rica Latina e, embora a regia˜o tenha ficado para tra´s em comparac¸a˜o
com os Estados Unidos e a Europa ocidental, ela melhorou ou preservou sua po-
sic¸a˜o em relac¸a˜o ao resto do mundo. Portanto a expressa˜o ‘‘de´cadas perdidas ’’ seria
uma retratac¸a˜o injusta do perı´odo entre 1820 e 1870.
Portuguese keywords : Ame´rica Latina, de´cadas perdidas, po´s-independeˆncia, se´culo
dezenove, come´rcio, crescimento econoˆmico.
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